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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robin Belden was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent 
to deliver following a jury trial. All of the State's evidence supporting this conviction 
resulted from a search of Mr. Belden's residence pursuant to a warrant. However, this 
warrant was modified from the original warrant that had been initially issued for another 
residence entirely. While Mr. Belden had earlier sought to suppress all of the evidence 
obtained under this warrant, asserting that the magistrate lacked probable cause to 
modify the warrant to authorize a search of Mr. Belden's residence, his motion to 
suppress was denied. Mr. Belden timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and 
sentence, and asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his home. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Police sought a warrant to execute a search on a mobile home described as 
located at "1100 Kootenai Cutoff Road, Space number twenty-three." (5/2/07 Search 
Warrant Hearing Tr.1, p.1, Ls.10-18.) At the initial warrant hearing, Officer Chris Higbee 
testified that he believed this residence was associated with Mr. Belden. (5/2/07 Search 
Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.19-21.) The officer's basis of knowledge came from two 
sources: an unnamed confidential informant and another officer who purportedly 
1 Because there are multiple transcripts of proceedings, for ease of reference, any 
citations to the transcripts will be made in accordance with the date of the proceeding. 
Additionally, because there were two different hearings regarding the issuance of the 
search warrant in this case, citations to these hearings will be made with reference to 
1 
observed the informant enter the home where an alleged drug buy occurred. (5/2/07 
Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1, L.22 - p.8, L.3.) 
The unnamed informant was working with police in order to reduce her own 
pending drug charges. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.4-11.) Officer 
Higbee represented that he could not vouch for the informant's credibility, but that he 
thought the informant would have knowledge about local drug activity from the fact that 
she was facing drug charges.2 (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-16.) The 
informant told police that she could arrange a drug buy from a man named "Robin" who 
had faced prior criminal charges for some unspecified offense. (5/2/07 Search Warrant 
Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.1-10.) After police conducted a search for all males with the first 
name "Robin" who had recent involvement with the court system, the informant picked 
Mr. Belden's photo out of some of the photos of the individuals identified. (5/2/07 
Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.8-10.) 
Officer Higbee represented to the court that police had conducted "visual 
surveillance" of the drug buy arranged through the confidential informant.. (5/2/07 
Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.11-14.) He testified that another officer personally 
observed the unnamed informant "Go to the door of space number twenty three of this 
mobile home park in Ponderay." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18.) 
While there was apparently an audio recording made of the alleged drug buy, none of 
whether the hearing was the search warrant hearing or the modification hearing that 
both took place on May 2, 2007. 
2 The transcript reflects that Officer Higbee was asked whether he could "vouwge" for 
the unnamed confidential informant's credibility. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.) However, the surrounding context of the question, and Officer 
Higbee's response, make clear that the officer was being asked whether he could vouch 
for the credibility of the informant. 
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the officers were familiar with Mr. Belden's voice and Officer Higbee testified that the 
recording made was "semi-poor". (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, L.21 - p.4, 
L.21.) At the point on the recording where the purported drug buy supposedly took 
place, Officer Higbee represented to the court that the recording was difficult to hear 
because there was interference with the audio. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.4, L.22 - p.5, L.3.) Officer Higbee did hear the other individual on the recording 
make a comment about dividing up or weighing a substance, but there was no specific 
conversation about requesting a quantity of marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.5, Ls.4-16.) The unnamed informant, who did not have any drugs in her 
possession before entering the mobile home, returned with a substance that field tested 
as positive for marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17 
- p.6, L.1.) 
In support of his application for a search warrant at the hearing, Officer Higbee 
provided the court with photographs of the mobile home located at space 23 of the 
mobile home park. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.5-9.) Although the 
officer stated that he was not the officer who conducted visual surveillance of the 
controlled drug buy, Officer Higbee did relate that, "Detective Flowe! who was assisting 
with that portion did see that and did tell me that that's their residence where the 
individual went in." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.16-21.) 
Based upon the testimony of Officer Higbee, the magistrate concluded that there 
was probable cause to believe that the mobile home located at space 23 contained 
evidence of possession or delivery of marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.8, Ls.6-12.) The court then issued a warrant to search the mobile home located in 
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space 23, and attached the photos that Officer Higbee provided of this home to the 
warrant. (R., pp.7-10.) 
No one was home at the mobile home that was located in space 23, so officers 
forced entry into the residence. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, 
Ls.11-22; Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, p.4.) It was immediately apparent to 
the officers executing the warrant that the layout of this residence did not match the 
description of the interior that was provided by the unnamed confidential informant. 
((5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.20-22.) Officer Higbee then 
spied a bill next to a phone in the house and discovered the name on the bill was not 
Mr. Belden's. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.22-23.) Upon 
speaking to the manager of the mobile home park, the officers learned that Mr. Belden's 
residence was two houses away, in space 25. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification 
Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.15-23.) Unlike the home located in space 23, which was blue-gray, 
the home located in space 25 was tan with brown trim. (5/2/07 Search Warrant 
Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.6-14.) 
At the modification hearing, Officer Higbee provided a different account of the 
information that linked the alleged criminal activity - the drug buy - to the home located 
in space 23 of the mobile home park. Whereas before he had asserted several times 
that another officer had personally observed the drug buy at that location, Officer 
Higbee now claimed that all of the information about the home at space 23 came from 
the unnamed informant and prior case notes about a misdemeanor probationer named 
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"Hans" that the officer claimed was Mr. Belden's roommate.3 (5/2/07 Search Warrant 
Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.5.) There was no testimony provided to the 
magistrate that would tend to link the mobile home at space 25 with the drug buy that 
Mr. Belden was alleged to have participated in the night before. (See 5/2/07 Search 
Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., generally.) 
Despite hearing no evidence that could explain the prior representations that 
another officer had observed the drug buy taking place at space 23, nor asking any 
questions as to how it was that these representations came to be made, the magistrate 
simply modified the warrant to indicate that police could search the home located in 
space 25, rather than space 23. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, 
L.24 - p.3, L.2.) The magistrate also asked the prosecutor if he would prefer her to 
cross out the pictures of the home at space 23 that were attached to the original 
warrant. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.1-2.) The court did 
so and added in the description that the house at space 25 was "tan with brown trim -
two mobile homes to the East of#23." (R., pp.13-16.) 
When police executed this modified warrant, they discovered a half ounce of 
marijuana, two pipes, a mason jar containing marijuana residue, four baggies, and a 
scale in Mr. Belden's bedroom. (5/4/07 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-14.) There was also a mason jar 
that contained "a quantity of marijuana" in Mr. Belden's closet. (5/4/07 Tr., p.4, Ls.21-
24.) Upon being contacted by police, Mr. Belden apparently acknowledged that he was 
3 It appears that Officer Higbee never actually spoke to the man identified as "Hanst but 
instead "pulled up" the prior case notes associated with this individual's misdemeanor 
probation. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, L.2.) 
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a personal user of marijuana and that he sometimes traded pot to other people for the 
price that he purchased it himself. (5/4/07 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.) 
Mr. Belden was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana) with intent to deliver. (R., pp.36-37.) He filed a motion to suppress all of 
the State's evidence because there was no probable cause to support the issuance of 
the search warrants in his case. (R., p.60; Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, pp.1-
6.) Mr. Belden brought this motion under both the Idaho State and the federal 
constitutions. (R., p.60.) 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Mr. Belden brought to the court's 
attention the fact that specific representations were made to the district court at the 
initial search warrant hearing that a police officer had personally observed the unnamed 
confidential informant enter into the mobile home in space 23, and coupled these 
representations with an address, a description, and pictures that were specific to this 
unit. (10/22/07 Tr., p.7, Ls.2-9.) He also pointed out that there was never any evidence 
presented that specifically linked the mobile home at space 25 to the alleged buy that 
formed the basis for the warrant. (10/22/07 Tr., p.8, L.11 - p.10, l.19.) Moreover, the 
only new information that was presented to the magistrate merely connected this 
residence to Mr. Belden. (10/22/07 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-13.) In light of the false information 
that was presented to the magistrate in support of the initial issuance of the warrant, 
and the failure to provide any reasoned explanation for the provision of this false 
information, Mr. Belden asserted that there was no longer any probable cause that 
would support the issuance of the amended warrant and that both the confidential 
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informant and the officers lacked credibility. (10/22/07 Tr., p. 28, L.6- p.29, L.10, p.30, 
Ls.3-23.) 
The district court at the suppression hearing expressed concerns about the 
complete failure of the State to explain provide an explanation for the presentation of 
testimony that an officer observed the drug buy occur at the home occupying space 23. 
(10/22/07 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.2.) Mr. Belden pointed out that no attempt was made 
to "rehabilitate" the testimony that had been provided earlier regarding the officer's 
purported observations at unit 23. (10/22/07 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-21.) Despite this, the 
prosecutor attempted to provide a hypothetical to the district court as to what may have 
happened. (10/22/07 Tr., p.15, L.18 - p.16, L.7.) The court correctly noted that this 
assertion was purely speculative and, in any case, was a version of events that was 
never presented to the magistrate and therefore could not be used in support of the 
probable cause determination for either warrant. (10/22/07 Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.3.) 
The district court then asked the prosecutor what evidence was presented to the 
magistrate "that shows Detective Flavel really saw the defendant go into No. 25 which is 
different in color than 23." (10/22/07 Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) The State never identified 
any such information, but merely asserted that it was night at the time that the officer 
purported to have observed the drug buy, and the court could take that factor into 
account. (10/22/07 Tr., p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.2.) 
After hearing the arguments of the parties and taking a brief recess, the district 
court concluded that, "a purchase from the confidential informant occurred and that it 
involved Robin Belden." (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-7.) The court further concluded that 
this buy did not occur at the home located in space 23 and that there was no 
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explanation for why the mistaken identification or description of the mobile home was 
provided to the magistrate. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.8.) 
The court then articulated that it was relying on case law from Idaho and around 
the country, "involving vehicles and nighttime and mistaken descriptions." (10/22/07 
Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23.) The district court never specified which specific cases it was 
relying on. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23.) The court found that, "a buy did occur and if 
it didn't occur at 25 it occurred very close to 25." (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.23-24.) 
Additionally, the court noted that the location of Mr. Belden's home, "is very close to the 
mistaken number of 23 and it was, in fact, 25. And wherever the buy occurred it had to 
occur very close to 25. I think that's a fair inference." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-10.) 
While noting that it was, "a bit of a close case," the district court denied Mr. Belden'$ 
motion to suppress.4 (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, Ls.15-16, p.35, Ls.3-4.) In doing so, the 
district court held that, "it's reasonable to search the residence even if the buy occurred 
at a different place in close proximity to his residence." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, 
L.2.) 
At trial, Officer Higbee testified that he searched Mr. Belden's home pursuant to a 
search warrant and found a rolled up baggie containing marijuana, two pipes, a loose 
marijuana bud on a table, and a mason jar that contained marijuana located behind a 
wall accessible through an electrical panel. (12/10/07 Tr., p.70, L.1 - p.79, L.2, p.79, 
Ls.16-21.) The officer also testified that he found a scale and several baggies that he 
believed were used in the weighing and packaging of marijuana for sale. (12/10/07 
Tr., p.79, L.3 - p.80, L.11.) A state forensic scientist testified that testing of a sample 
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taken from Mr. Belden's residence tested positive for marijuana. (12/10/07 Tr., p.118, 
L.23-p.119, L.4, p.125, L.23-p.126, L.18.) 
Officer Higbee also testified that, after executing the search warrant on 
Mr. Belden's home, he spoke to Mr. Belden, who admitted to using marijuana and 
occasionally "trading" marijuana for money. 5 (12/10/07 Tr., p.102, L.23 - p.103, L.15.) 
Mr. Belden also explained that most of the marijuana he had purchased was for his own 
personal use. (12/10/07 Tr., p.105, Ls.5-12.) 
Mr. Belden was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. 
(12/10/07 Tr., p.165, Ls.12-24; R., p.71.) He was sentenced to two years, with one year 
fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction.6 (R., pp.96-98.) Mr. Belden timely 
appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., pp.96, 110.) 
4 While the district court orally denied this motion at the suppression hearing, the 
court's written order on this motion was not entered until April 16, 2008. (R., p.108.) 
5 There was an additional hearing regarding the State's !.C.R. 404(b) notice that it 
intended to use Mr. Belden's statements to police regarding his own past marijuana use 
and past "trading" in marijuana for money. (See 12/7/07 Tr., generally.) Because 
Mr. Belden does not challenge on appeal the district court's ruling that these statements 
were admissible to show knowledge and intent, the full arguments and course of 
rroceedings for this hearing are not described herein. 
Execution of Mr. Belden's judgment of conviction and sentence in this case has been 
stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. (R., p.106.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress the State's 
evidence because the district court applied the wrong legal standard to its determination 
of the lawfulness of the search; there was no nexus between the alleged crime and the 
place to be searched; the State either intentionally presented false evidence in support 
of the issuance of the warrant or presented evidence with reckless disregard for its 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Belden's Motion To Suppress The State's 
Evidence Because The District Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standard To Its 
Determination Of The Lawfulness Of The Search: There Was No Nexus Between The 
Alleged Crime And The Place To Be Searched: The State Either Intentionally Presented 
False Evidence In Support Of The Issuance Of The Warrant. Or Presented False 
Evidence With Reckless Disregard For Its Truth: And There Was No Evidence That 
Could Support A Finding Of Veracity Of The Unnamed Confidential Informant 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Belden asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his home pursuant to 
a modified warrant. First, the district court erroneously applied legal principles from 
cases involving the search of vehicles and further erroneously determined that probable 
cause to search a home can be established if there is criminal activity that occurs 
nearby. Second, there is nothing in the information that was presented to the 
magistrate, either at the initial probable cause hearing or at the hearing to modify the 
warrant, that could establish a nexus between the alleged crime, the evidence sought to 
be seized, and Mr. Belden's residence. Third, the State either intentionally or recklessly 
presented false information that was material to the determination of probable cause in 
support of its application for the initial warrant, and made no effort to rehabilitate the 
information presented at the subsequent modification hearing. Finally, there was no 
evidence that would support a finding of the veracity or the basis of knowledge of the 
unnamed confidential informant in this case, and the subsequent information provided 
by police was either erroneous or lacked any discernible connection to Mr. Belden and 
his home. In light of all of these deficiencies with the underlying warrants in this case, 
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there is no substantial basis upon which probable cause could have reasonably been 
found and the district court erred when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Legal Standards 
Upon review of a district court's decision to grant or deny a suppression motion, 
the determination of whether a search violated the Fourth Amendment is a question of 
law that this Court reviews de novo. See, e.g., State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 469, 
197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008). While the ultimate issue of whether a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred is reviewed de novo, this Court will uphold any 
factual findings by the district court unless these findings are clearly erroneous. Id. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that, "The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
"Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit."'7 State v. Ramos, 142 
Idaho 628, 630, 130 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005). 
In reviewing a magistrate's determination of probable cause, this Court looks to 
the warrant affidavit submitted to the court, or the transcript of the testimony presented, 
to determine whether it provided the court with a substantial basis for concluding that 
7 Because the same test applies for probable cause under both the federal and the 
Idaho constitutions, Mr. Belden does not separately analyze the district court's rulings 
regarding this issue under each constitutional provision. See State v. Schaffer, 133 
Idaho 126, 133, 982 P.2d 961, 968 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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probable cause existed.8 State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004). 
This Court applies a "totality of the circumstances" test and resolves doubt in favor of 
the validity of the warrant. Id. 
C. The District Court Applied The Wrong Legal Standards In Determining The 
Lawfulness Of The Search Of Mr. Belden's Residence 
The district court at the suppression hearing case abused its discretion and 
committed legal error by applying erroneous legal standards to two aspects of its 
ultimate determination that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case: first, 
the district court erroneously relied on case law that dealt with, "vehicles and nighttime 
and mistaken descriptions;" and, second, the district court erroneously concluded that 
mere proximity to suspected criminal activity is sufficient to give rise to probable cause 
to search a residence. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-23; p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.2) (emphasis 
added.) 
It is very well established that searches involving vehicles - usually undertaken 
under the so-called "automobile exception" - are subject to fundamentally different 
standards than are searches of homes. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-
394 (1985). This distinction between automobiles and homes is grounded primarily in 
two bases. First, automobiles have the capacity to be quickly moved. Id. at 390. 
Second, people have a reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles than in homes 
due to greater exposure of the interior of cars as well as the pervasive regulation of 
vehicles. Id. at 391-392. 
8 In Idaho, testimony at a probable cause hearing in support of a search warrant can 
take the place of an affidavit of probable cause. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d 
at 662. 
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In sharp contrast to the reduced expectations of privacy and Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach to searches of vehicles, it is equally well-established that private 
homes receive the highest protections of the Fourth Amendment. "It is axiomatic that 
the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed."' Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (quoting 
U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Simply put, the basic Fourth 
Amendment principles that are attendant on searches of vehicles are fundamentally 
different than those that apply to a search of a home; and therefore the district court 
should not have relied on case law governing the search of vehicles in determining 
whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case.9 
Additionally, the district court erroneously concluded that, "it's reasonable to 
search the residence even if the buy occurred at a different place in close proximity to 
his residence." (10/22/07 Tr., p.34, L.25 - p.35, L.2.) This is an incorrect statement of 
the law. Probable cause to suspect that criminal activity is occurring near a residence is 
insufficient to establish the required nexus between the place to be searched and the 
evidence sought. See U.S. v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). As is 
discussed more fully below, the required nexus is between the alleged criminal activity 
and the actual location to be searched. See Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d at 662. 
Criminal activity nearby is not sufficient. 
9 This Court may also wish to note that the district court failed to articulate either which 
cases involving vehicles, mistakes, and nighttime that the court was relying on; or what 
the significant holdings of these cases are. (10/22107 Tr., p.33, L.19 - p.34, L.14.) 
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D. The Initial Testimony And Resulting Search Warrant Identified What Was 
Apparently The Wrong Location And There Was No Subsequent Nexus 
Presented In Support Of The Warrant To Connect Mr. Belden's Residence To 
The Underlying Alleged Criminal Activity Or Items To Be Seized 
Mr. Belden asserts that the facts presented to the magistrate at the initial warrant 
hearing and at the subsequent hearing on the modification of the warrant failed to 
establish the required nexus between his residence, the underlying crime alleged, and 
the evidence to be seized. 
In order to provide an adequate basis to support a determination of probable 
cause, the facts presented in the affidavit or testimony of the officer must establish a 
sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the 
place to be searched. State v. Sorbet, 124 Idaho 275, 278, 858 P.2d 814, 817 (Ct. App. 
1993). "Most courts require that a nexus between the items to be seized and the place 
to be searched must be established by specific facts; an officer's general conclusions 
are not enough." Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d at 662. 
An incorrect address for a warrant to search a premise may invalidate a search 
warrant. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 159, 857 P.2d 634, 638 (Ct. App. 1993). 
"However, inaccurate directions to the premises to be searched will not make the seized 
evidence inadmissible if a reasonable officer could ascertain and identify the place to be 
searched." Id. And police have a duty under the Fourth Amendment to provide the 
correct "particulars" describing the place to be searched to the magistrate. U.S. v. 
Collins, 830 F.2d 145, 145-146 (9th Cir. 1987). 
The Collins decision is instructive for this Court regarding the underlying duty of 
police to provide accurate information regarding the description of the place to be 
searched. In Collins, the search warrant obtained by police was for a residence at "300 
15 
Springdale Street," that was described as a white house with a dark roof that was the 
"last house on the west side" of the street. Collins, 830 F.2d at 145. When police 
searched the house located at the specified street address, they did not find any 
evidence of drugs or other criminal activity. Id. But this house was also not the last 
house on the west side of the street. Id. That house was yellow-gold with a gray roof 
and green trim. Id. When police searched the last house on the west side of the street, 
they found a shed containing a methamphetamine laboratory. Id. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination that 
the evidence resulting from the second search should not be suppressed. In doing so, 
the Collins Court noted two things that are especially cogent for the search at issue in 
this case. First, the court noted that, "The evil guarded against by the Fourth 
Amendment is doubled when the particularity of the warrant is an erroneous 
particularity." Id. at 146. In other words, when a police officer provides both an 
erroneous address and an erroneous description for the place to be searched, the 
potential for a Fourth Amendment violation increases exponentially. Here, the 
magistrate was presented with a specific address, a specific description, and a set of 
pictures that were all fundamentally different than Mr. Belden's residence. 
Second, the Collins Court explained that the provision of this erroneous 
information violated a fundamental duty of the officers to provide accurate and truthful 
information in support of a search warrant, and the failure to do so misled the magistrate 
who issued the warrant. Id. The court held: 
There was not only a reasonable probability that another premise might 
mistakenly be searched, but another premise was searched. They had an 
address that they followed to the wrong house. The wrong address they 
had was due to their own carelessness and lack of common prudence; 
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they had not carried out their duty to get the right particulars; they did not 
disclose what they had "a duty to discover and disclose." 
Id. (quoting Ma,yland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987)). 
Here, as in Collins, the officers provided to the magistrate issuing the warrant 
what was apparently erroneous information: that an officer had personally observed the 
unnamed informant enter into the home located at space 23 in order to perform a 
controlled drug buy. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18.) The officers 
then provided a series of erroneous particularities to the court - a description and 
pictures of this mobile home. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.7, Ls.5-9.) When 
the officers returned to modify the warrant, they provided no reasoned explanation for 
their dereliction. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., generally.) But, 
even more important for this Court, they also provided no nexus that would connect the 
home located in space 25 to the underlying criminal activity alleged or to the items that 
officers expected to seize. 
The only additional information that was provided to the magistrate in support of 
issuing a modified warrant for the home located at space 25 was that the manager of 
the mobile home park identified this location as Mr. Belden's residence. (5/2/07 Search 
Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.15-23.) However, mere probable cause to 
believe that a person has committed a crime does not, of itself, give rise to probable 
cause to search that person's home. See State v. Molina, 125 Idaho 637, 642, 873 
P.2d 891, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). Here, the only nexus that existed in support of the 
warrant issued for the home located at space 25 was a link between the individual that 
officers suspected, Mr. Belden, and the location to be searched. There was no nexus 
17 
established between the criminal activity alleged, the things to be seized, and 
Mr. Belden's residence. 
Some Idaho cases have recognized a limited exception to this rule, and found 
that there may be probable cause to search a defendant's residence for evidence of 
drug trafficking based on suspicions regarding the defendant, if the evidence presented 
in support of the warrant indicates that the defendant is a regular drug trafficker. 
State v. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho 278,287, 141 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis 
added). In O'Keefe, the evidence presented to the magistrate indicated that the 
defendant maintained a sophisticated and large-scale marijuana grow operation at a 
warehouse leased by the defendant. Id. at 288, 141 P.3d at 1157. Similarly, in State v. 
Nunez, the Idaho Supreme Court held that there was a sufficient nexus to permit the 
search of the defendant's residence where there was evidence of "non-stop," high 
volume methamphetamine trafficking (in excess of $10,000 per day) and specific 
information from a confidential informant that the defendant kept most of his drugs at his 
home. State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 641-642, 67 P.3d 831, 836-837 (2003). But 
essential to the finding of probable cause to search the defendant's residence in these 
cases is the presentation of specific facts demonstrating regular and on-going drug 
trade activities on the part of the defendant. See also State v. Stevens, 139 Idaho 670, 
673, 84 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Ct. App. 2004). 
There were no facts before the magistrate in this case that could support the 
inference that Mr. Belden was a regular drug deafer who was engaged in a large-scale 
drug manufacturing or trafficking trade. The sum total of the information presented to 
the magistrate in support of the warrant regarding Mr. Belden's potential status as a 
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drug dealer was that an unnamed confidential informant, working with police in order to 
reduce her own charges, "believe[d] that they could buy marijuana from the person [the 
officer] subsequently identified as Mr. Belden." (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.1, 
L.22 - p.2, L.21.) The informant's belief that she could motivate Mr. Belden to sell her 
marijuana provides no information as to Mr. Belden's history of significant drug 
trafficking, nor does it in any way support an inference that Mr. Belden is a large-scale 
drug dealer. As such, there is no factual basis from which the magistrate could have 
found probable cause to issue a warrant to search Mr. Belden's residence exclusively 
from the bare fact of the suspicion of police that he had sold a small amount of 
marijuana to a confidential informant. 
While the prosecutor presented theories to the district court at the suppression 
hearing as to how this error might have occurred, this speculation is of no avail to 
establishing any nexus between the alleged criminal activity and Mr. Belden's actual 
residence located in space 25 of the mobile home park. (10/22/07 Tr., p.15, L.18 -
p.16, L.7, p.20, L.12 - p.21, L.3, p.22, L.13 - p.23, L.17.) It is undisputed there was no 
evidence presented at the hearing seeking a modification of the search warrant that 
provided any explanation at all for the prior testimony that an officer had personally 
observed the drug buy take place at the home located at space 23, nor was there 
additional testimony from the officer purportedly observing the drug buy that he had 
witnessed the buy occurring at space 25. (See 10/22/07 Tr., generally.) In reviewing 
the sufficiency of a nexus to support a finding of probable cause, this Court is limited to 
a review of evidence that is actually presented to the issuing judge. See, e.g., 
Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971) (insufficient affidavit in support of a 
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warrant cannot be rehabilitated by subsequent testimony not disclosed to the issuing 
magistrate); State v. Bohan, 864 P.2d 26, 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that 
warrant containing wrong address must be evaluated under the actual facts of the case, 
not in the hypothetical). And, as has been noted, there is nothing in the evidence 
presented to the district court that could sustain a finding of a nexus between the home 
located at space 25 of the mobile home park and the underlying criminal activity alleged 
or the evidence to be seized. 
In light of this, the court lacked an adequate basis to establish probable cause for 
the search of Mr. Belden's residence, and the district court erred when it denied 
Mr. Belden's motion to suppress. 
E. The State Either Intentionally Presented False Information To The District Court 
In Support . Of It Application For A Search Warrant, Or Presented False 
Information With Reckless Disregard For Its Truth 
Mr. Belden further asserts that the evidence garnered as a result of the search of 
his home should have been suppressed because the record demonstrates the search 
warrant was procured through the intentional or reckless presentation of false 
information by the law enforcement officer at the probable cause hearing. 
The Fourth Amendment requires not only a factual showing sufficient to establish 
probable cause, but also that this factual showing is truthful. Franks v. Delaware, 438 
U.S. 154, 164-165 (1978). "To have a warrant set aside on the ground that its issuance 
was based on a false representation of material fact, the defendant must establish that 
the false representation: (1) was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for truth; and (2) that the facts included or omitted were material to the 
magistrate's finding of probable cause." Sorbet, 124 Idaho at 279, 858 P.2d at 818. 
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The inclusion of false facts in the affidavit or testimony of the officer is material if, 
without that information, probable cause would not have been found. Id. Whether the 
misrepresentation of fact is material is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. 
Id. 
Where the falsehoods presented were the result of negligence, rather than 
recklessness, such information does not invalidate a warrant and may be considered 
when reviewing the warrant for probable cause. State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 511, 927 
P .2d 897, 901 (Ct. App. 1996). A false statement may be deemed reckless where the 
statement falsely attributes to a witness a description of property or evidence that was 
not, in fact, made by the witness. Id. at 513, 927 P.2d at 903. Whether a false 
statement in support of an affidavit is intentional or reckless, as opposed to negligent, 
may also be inferred by the relative importance of the information. See State v. 
Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 48, 981 P.2d 1154, 1158 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Where an officer presents testimony at one hearing that is plainly and 
unambiguously contradicted by that officer's testimony at a subsequent hearing, with no 
plausible explanation provided for the discrepancy, the officer's testimony will be 
deemed to plainly lack credibility on the face of the record. State v. Munoz, _ Idaho 
_, _P.3d _, Supreme Court Docket No. 34149 (Ct. App. March 25, 2009), pp.6-
8.10 And such a plain lack of credibility due to clearly contradictory testimony renders it 
"impossible to give credence to either version" of events provided through the officer's 
testimony. Id. at p.8. 
10 As of the writing of this brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals Opinion in Munoz has not 
yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, and is therefore subject 
to revision or withdrawal. 
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Here, there can be no meaningful debate that the magistrate who issued the 
warrant was presented with information that was false. It was expressly represented to 
the magistrate on more than one occasion at the initial search warrant hearing that an 
officer had witnessed the confidential informant go into the home located as space 23 in 
order to complete the arranged drug buy. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, 
Ls.15-18, p.7, Ls.5-21.) Upon executing the initial warrant on this residence, the layout 
of the interior did not match the description given and a bill sitting by the phone was 
addressed to someone other than Mr. Belden. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification 
Hearing Tr., p.1, Ls.19-23.) With no explanation for his earlier statements, the officer 
changed his story at the modification hearing to represent that the information regarding 
the address of the home located at space 23 was actually relayed by the confidential 
informant, rather than being established by the observations of the officer.11 (5/2/07 
Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23-p.2, L.3.) 
The fact of where the alleged drug buy occurred was material, and was virtually 
the entire basis for the execution of the warrant at that address. The only connection 
between the place to be searched and the underlying alleged criminal activity at the 
initial warrant hearing was testimony representing that a police officer had seen the 
arranged drug buy take place at this location. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., generally.) If Officer Higbee did, in fact, receive the information regarding the 
11 The officer also stated that he had pulled up the case notes from an individual who 
was believed to be Mr. Belden's roommate and who was on misdemeanor probation, 
and that these notes indicated that the person believed to be his roommate resided at 
the residence located at space 23. The officer does not specify who or what was the 
source of the information indicating that this other individual was Mr. Belden's 
roommate. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification Hearing Tr., p.1, L.23 - p.2, L.5.) 
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specific address of the alleged drug buy from the unnamed confidential informant rather 
than another police officer, then he intentionally misrepresented the source of this 
information to the district court. And the source of the information was particularly 
important, given that the officer also testified at this same hearing that he could not 
vouch for the informant's credibility. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.) 
If the information regarding the location of the alleged drug buy did come from 
the officer who observed it, then, at the very least, the provision of the false information 
as to the address was reckless on the part of this officer. This error was compounded 
when the officer then provided a description and photographs of the home located at 
space 23, which was not Mr. Belden's home. See Collins, 830 F.2d at 145-146. The 
address of the place to be searched is not a de minimus detail that holds no bearing for 
the determination of probable cause. In this case, there could be no probable cause for 
the warrant in absence of an identification of the proper place to be searched. As such, 
the information regarding where the criminal activity allegedly occurred was the most 
important piece of information in order to obtain a search warrant for that location. And 
the police in this case never stated or implied at the modification hearing (or at any point 
in the proceedings) that the officer actually observed any activity take place at 
Mr. Belden's residence located at space 25. (See 5/2/07 Search Warrant Modification 
Hearing Tr., generally.) If the improperly submitted information - the erroneous 
statement of where the drug buy occurred - is excised from the record, there is simply 
no basis for a warrant to have issued in this case. 
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F. The Search Warrant Lacked Probable Cause Because There Was Insufficient 
lndicia Of Reliability Or Veracity To Support The Allegations Made By The 
Unnamed Confidential Informant 
In this case, the magistrate was expressly told that police could not vouch for the 
veracity of the unnamed confidential informant. It was solely the information provided 
for the unnamed confidential informant that provided any basis to suspect Mr. Belden of 
any criminal activity. Because the totality of the circumstances reveal an insufficient 
basis to find any veracity or reliability of the information obtained from the unnamed 
informant, both the finding of probable cause to issue the warrants in this case, made in 
part on reliance on the informant's statements, and the district court's ultimate finding 
that a drug buy did occur and "it involved Robin Belden," lack substantial, competent 
evidence in support of those findings. (10/22/07 Tr., p.33, Ls.5-7.) 
"Where a warrant application is based in part upon the information provided by 
an informant, factors supporting probable cause may include facts in the affidavit 
indicating the reliability of the informant and the basis of the informant's knowledge." 
Peterson, 133 Idaho at 47, 981 P.2d at 1157. These considerations are evaluated 
under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Alexander, 138 Idaho 18, 23, 56 P.3d 
780, 785 (Ct. App. 2002). The factors of veracity and basis of knowledge, while not 
strictly required, are especially important considerations in cases dealing with unnamed 
informants. State v. Prestwich, 110 Idaho 966, 968, 719 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Ct. App. 
1986). Where police are unable to vouch for the veracity of an unidentified confidential 
informant, the information offered by that informant should be credited with little weight. 
Id. In such cases, factual corroboration by law enforcement or independent evidence of 
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incriminating details become critical. Id. at 969, 719 P.2d at 1229; State v. Patterson, 
139 Idaho 858, 864, 87 P.3d 967, 973 (Ct. App. 2003). 
In this case, the officer at the initial search warrant hearing expressly stated that 
he was unable to vouch for the credibility of the unnamed confidential informant. 
(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.8-11.) It is apparent that the informant was 
motivated by the desire to reduce her own drug charges in exchange for providing 
information to police. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, Ls.4-7.) Prior to the 
alleged drug buy, the sole initial details provided by this informant about Mr. Belden 
appear to be her belief that she could get "Robin" to sell her marijuana, the informant's 
identification of Mr. Belden's photo as the man named "Robin," and that she had told 
police that Mr. Belden had a prior, unidentified charge and was on work release. 
(5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.2, L.17 - p.3, L.10.) There was testimony 
regarding an officer observing the purported drug buy take place at the home located in 
space 23 of the mobile home park. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing Tr., p.3, Ls.15-18; 
p.7, Ls.5-21.) However, this information turned out to have been erroneous, and 
therefore cannot stand as corroborative of anything. See Munoz, Supreme Court Case 
No. 34149 at pp.7-8. (See also 512107 Search Warrant Modification Hearing 
Tr., generally.) 
The officer also testified that there was evidence indicating that the confidential 
informant did purchase a small quantity of marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17 - p.6, L1.) More precisely, the informant went into the 
house without marijuana and returned with marijuana. (5/2/07 Search Warrant Hearing 
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-12, p.5, L.17 - p.6, L1.) But none of the evidence observed by law 
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enforcement regarding this transaction corroborated that it was Mr. Belden who had 
participated in this purchase. 
There was additionally an audio recording of the alleged drug buy. However, this 
audio recording: (1) was never presented to the court at the probable cause hearing; 
(2) does not appear to have identified Mr. Belden and the officer could not verify that 
Mr. Belden was the person on the recording; and (3) there are significant portions of this 
recording that are difficult to hear due to sound interference, including those portions of 
the recording wherein the actual drug buy allegedly took place. (5/2/07 Search Warrant 
Hearing Tr., p.3, L.19 - p.5, L.3.) In light of this, and particularly given that the officer 
could not identify Mr. Belden as the person on the recording, there is simply no basis to 
conclude that this evidence could support the informant's allegation that Mr. Belden was 
the person who sold her the marijuana, 
In this case, the initial warrant was procured and built upon a fragile house of 
cards supported only by an unnamed confidential informant whose veracity could not be 
established and with a motive to criminally implicate others in order to reduce her own 
charges; representations made as to the observations of police that were revealed to be 
patently erroneous, with no explanation for this dereliction; and a poor recording of a 
purported drug buy that was never played for the court and in which Mr. Belden cannot 
be identified as the other person in the drug transaction. No effort was made on the 
part of the State to rehabilitate these deficiencies when the second, modified warrant 
was sought. This tenuous foundation cannot provide a substantial basis upon which to 
conclude that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Mr. Belden's home. 
Once the magistrate became aware of all of these facts at the modification hearing, the 
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court could no longer have reasonably found that probable cause existed to support the 
issuance of a search warrant for Mr. Belden's home. As such, the district court erred 
when it denied Mr. Belden's motion to suppress all of the evidence directly or 
derivatively obtained as a result of the search of his home because this search violated 
Mr. Belden's Fourth Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Belden respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful 
search of his residence. Additionally, Mr. Belden asks that this Court reverse his 
judgment of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of March, 2009. 
~~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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